DEADLOCKED JURIES AND DYNAMITE: A CRITICAL
LOOK AT THE "ALLEN CHARGE"
Deadlocks have historically been a problem in jury trials. The solution
of the 14th century circuit-riding judge was simply to load the jurors
into oxcarts and carry them about with him until a verdict was "bounced
out."1 More recently, jurors have been prodded by such judicial indiscretions as bread and water diets and jury rooms purposely left unheated in the dead of winter.2 Crude methods of forcing verdicts have
long gone out of fashion, but more subtle means of jury "coercion"
still exist. One of these is known as the "Allen charge."
The Allen charge, often called the "dynamite charge," is a special
instruction given to encourage deadlocked juries to reach agreement.
The charge was first used in a Massachusetts case in 1851,3 and in
4
1896 was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States.
The central emphasis of the instruction is usually stated in this manner:
No juror is expected to yield his conscientiously-held opinion.
However, if much the larger number is for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt is a reasonable one
which made no impression upon the minds of so many men,
equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If upon the
other hand, the majority is for acquittal, the minority ought to
ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the
correctness of a judgment which is not concurred in by the
majority. 5
The purpose of this comment is to consider whether the Allen charge
can operate as a coercive influence on the jury, and, if it is capable of
of such influence, whether the charge can be subjected to effective appellate review.
"Coercion" in this context means that the charge is capable of causing
a minority juror to substitute the majority's opinion for his own-not
that he is persuaded to reach a different decision, but that he accepts
I CRABB, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 287 (1829).

2 This sort of frontier justice was employed as recently as 1940. See Mead v. City
of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941).
3 Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851).

4 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
5 This example of a typical Allen charge is paraphrased from the court's language
in the original charge in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Gush.) 1, 3 (1851). The
charge approved by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States, supra note 4, was

quite similar.
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the majority view in spite of his own conviction as to the defendant's
guilt or innocence. Claims of such coercive influence are usually based
on one of two grounds: First, language is often added to or left out of
the charge, distorting the ostensibly "proper" thrust of the approved
wording; second, the argument has been made that the charge, no
matter how properly phrased, is itself coercive. Most appeals based on
the instruction stress the first argument. Appellate courts have reversed
where the trial judge failed to include language emphasizing the individual juror's right to retain his conscientiously-held dissenting viewpoint,0 or added language emphasizing a "duty to agree. ' 7 On the other
hand, the federal courts have never reversed an Allen charge case solely
on grounds that the language and thrust of the central charge were
improper, and only an occasional state court has found the instruction
8
coercive on its face.
The courts have, on the whole, favored the use of the charge because
it is an efficient tool and, perhaps, because early Supreme Court approval
6 United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 1961).
7 People v. Barmore, 368 Mich. 26, 117 N.W.2d 186 (1962). See also Huffman v.
United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 955 (1962). Appellate courts have looked with disfavor upon comments from the
bench about swallowing one's own view, United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341, 343
(4th Cir. 1962), or expressed opinions that the jury should have no trouble reaching
agreement, Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1961); Kelsey v. United
States, 47 F.2d 453, 454 (5th Cir. 1931).
8 The Kansas court expressly disapproved the charge taken from the original
Allen instruction in Eikmeier v. Bennett, 143 Kan. 888, 896, 57 P.2d 87, 92 (1936):
"To say to a minority that they should re-examine their views in the light of the
opinion held by the majority, without putting a like duty on the majority . . . is
wrong. The minority may be right and the majority wrong. Until the Legislature
provides for verdicts by a definite majority of the jury, the court, by additional
instruction, should not suggest, even faintly, that the opinion of the minority is
to be controlled by that of the majority." Courts in Idaho, Iowa and Wisconsin have
discouraged use of the charge. State v. Moon, 20 Idaho 202, 117 Pac. 757 (1911);
Middle States Util. Co. v. Incorporated Tel. Co., 222 Iowa 1275, 271 N.W. 180 (1937);
State v. Pierce, 178 Iowa 417, 159 N.W. 1050 (1916). See generally Annot., 109 A.L.R.
72, 85 (1937); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1257, 1262 (1951). Recently a few strong dissenting
opinions by federal judges in the Fifth Circuit have objected to the charge as a
judicial bludgeon. See the dissents in Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d
754, 755 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). Green v. United States, 309
F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962), decided within days after Andrews, struck down a use of
the charge in the original instructions. The court's opinion in Green was written by
Judge Wisdom, the dissenter in Andrews, and, incidentally, the only judge who took
part in both cases. But see United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 484 n.18 (2d Cir.
1963), where the Second Circuit expressly disagreed with the recent Fifth Circuit
criticisms of the charge. In Kahaner, the charge was repeated at the jury's request,
and was nevertheless upheld. It should be noted, however, that the trial court in
Kahaner laid great stress on the individual juror's right to retain his conscientiouslyheld opinion.
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gave it an aura of respectability. 9 One can, however, by examining the
reaction of the courts to certain apparent effects of the charge and
accompanying practices, see evidence of a judicial attitude that the
instruction approaches maximum permissible limits.10 An example of
this attitude is found in United States v. Rogers," where the charge
was administered to a jury which had been unable to agree after five
hours of deliberation. Fifteen minutes after the instruction was given,
the jury returned a verdict of conviction. In reversing, the appellate
court said: "The time interval was quite long enough for acceptance of
a theory of majority rule, but was hardly long enough to have permitted
a painstaking re-examination of the views which the minority had held
steadfastly until the charge was given."' 2 One practice which almost
always results in reversal is the making of inquiry by the court as to
the division of the jury.'3 Such inquiry, followed by the Allen charge,
has been disapproved because it too pointedly directs the charge at a
partially identified minority.
While these isolated instances of disapproval indicate an undefined
awareness in the impropriety of the instruction, limiting review of the
charge to the discernible reaction of the jurors, or to overzealous statements and inquiries by the trial court, ignores the fundamental problem
of the Allen instruction-its coercive influence is a function of the context in which it is given, and as such, is always present. The predictable jury reaction to the instruction would be both the reinforcement
of the view of the majority, since the charge contains no admonition that
majority jurors should reexamine their opinions, and a conclusion on
the part of minority jurors that the charge is directed entirely at themthat the weight of judicial prestige is being added to the pressure already exerted by the other jurors. The charge usually comes at a psychological low point in the proceedings when suggestions calculated to
bring agreement are apt to be met with less than ordinary critical
) Often an assignment of error based on the charge is dismissed summarily with a
citation to Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). See, e.g., Andrews v. United
States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963); Huffman v.
United States, 297 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962).
10 United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961). Similar comments are
found in Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962) ("There is small,
if any, justification for its use."); United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962)
("Unaccented and unembellished, the Allen charge is quite bold enough . . .
See also comments of the Kansas court in Eikmeier v. Bennett, 143 Kan. 888, 57
P.2d 87 (1936).
11 United States v. Rogers, supra note 10, at 436.
12 Ibid.
13 Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926). The inquiry "can rarely be
resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious though unmeasurable,
an improper influence upon the jury ...."
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evaluation. A minority member might well take the charge as an invitation to allow the majority to rule.14 At least, there is a likelihood that
he will be demoralized by this "official" language urging him to heed
the majority.15
While the purpose of the Allen charge is to eliminate, where possible,
mistrials brought about by hung juries, this is a legitimate purpose only
if the change in minority opinion is accompanied by an honest change
in its view of the evidence. A change induced by pressure, no matter
how subtle, is an unwarranted infringement on the function of the jury.
Many states have provided by constitution or statute that jury trials in
criminal cases will be by unanimous verdict. 16 Others, following the
federal example, have regarded the unanimity requirement as an integral
part of the jury system as it was known at common law, and thus have
interpreted state constitutional provisions for "trial by jury" as requiring
unanimity. 17 If unanimity is to have any real meaning in criminal jury
trials, each juror must be convinced by the evidence presented of the
accused's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt"' s before the jury can be
14 This was apparently the case in United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir.
1961). See also Acunto v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 270 App. Div.
386, 60 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1946).
15 Minimally, the Allen charge furnishes a negative sanction to the majority. No
mention is made in the typical Allen instruction of the need for any reevaluation
of the majority's point of view. The tone of the charge indicates that any such
reevaluation would only take the jury farther from its goal-agreement. If the court
creates the impression that it regards the majority view as immutable, then in effect
it is conceding that the only remaining possible outcomes are unanimous verdict for
the side the majority favors, or mistrial. It would seem that it is the court's duty
to refrain from pointing the jury in any direction.
16 Seven states have constitutional requirements for unanimous verdicts in all
criminal cases. ME. CONsT. art. I, § 7; MD. CONST. D.R. art. 21; N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; S.C. CONSr. art. V, § 22; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; VT. CoNs-r. art. I, § 10; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Several other states require unanimity except in cases not amounting to a felony. Oregon allows conviction by a vote of 10 or more jurors, except in
capital cases. ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11.
17 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 299 (1930). See 3 BLAcKSTONE, COM,7ENTARIES
379 (3d ed. 1884); FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(2). In State v. Robbins, - Ohio -, 189 N.E.2d
641 (1963), conviction by the majority of a three-judge court was reversed on grounds
that the defendant, in waiving trial by jury, did not thereby waive trial, and on
trial before three judges he retained all statutory rights not waived. The court
concluded that the Ohio "reasonable doubt" statute required the assent of all three
judges before conviction could be upheld. A case with similar facts is now on review
in the New York courts.
18 The reasonable doubt concept had its origins in the 18th century and had
become an established part of Anglo-American criminal procedure by the 1820's.
For a discussion, see 9 VIGMoR, EvIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940). See also May, Some
Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 Aml. L. REv.
642 (1876). Some courts have viewed the unanimity requirement as a function of the
reasonable doubt standard. In Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir.
1953), the court struck down a majority verdict of conviction reached by consent
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said to be convinced. Under such a view the tentative opinions of a
mere majority should have no legal significance. Thus considered, the
Allen charge is misleading in that it encourages jurors to take into
account a factor outside the evidence-the impact of their own preliminary balloting. They are instructed, late in the proceedings, to
reconsider their position in the light of the majority's vote. Yet there
is no connection between the majority vote and the reasonableness of
an individual juror's doubt. Although it is probably more often true
that the majority view reflects the best judgment of the facts, criminal
trial decisions are not supposed to rest upon mere probability. 19
of the parties, saying: "The unanimity of a verdict in a criminal case is inextricably
interwoven with the required measure of proof. To sustain the validity of a verdict
by less than all the jurors is to destroy this test of proof, for there cannot be a verdict
supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt if one or more jurors remain reasonably
in doubt as to guilt." In Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
Prettyman, J., summarized the relationship of reasonable doubt to the unanimity
requirement: "An accused is presumed to be innocent. Guilt must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. All twelve jurors must be convinced beyond that doubt;
if only one of them fixedly has a reasonable doubt, a verdict of guilty cannot be
They are working rules of
returned. These principles are not pious platitudes ....
law binding upon the court."
19 Counts v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 744, 747, 119 S.E. 79, 81 (1923), and cases cited
in note 18 supra. The new role given by some courts to the reasonable doubt concept
makes the use of the Allen instruction an even greater potential danger to the
defendant's rights. The historical view is that reasonable doubt is to be considered
by the trial judge in passing upon motions for a judgment of acquittal, and by
appellate courts in deciding whether the trial court erred in sending the case to the
jury. The courts use the standard to delineate a zone in which the jury can act.
The newer view, usually called the Second Circuit rule, confines proof beyond reasonable doubt to the role of an instruction to the jury. The standard is not considered
in ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence; at that point there is to be no difference
between the rule in civil and criminal cases. If there is substantial circumstantial
evidence of each element of an offense, the case is to go to the jury. This Second
Circuit rule intensifies the conflict between reasonable doubt and the Allen charge.
Under the historic view there is at least the assurance that the court, before entrusting the case to the jury, has already imposed the reasonable doubt standard. Any
misinterpretation or coercive effect of the Allen charge is thereby mollified. With
proof beyond reasonable doubt removed from the legal test of sufficiency of the
evidence, the jury is left, under the Second Circuit view, with the sole responsibility
for employing the standard. Adding the Allen charge at this point tends to dilute
the effect of the reasonable doubt instruction. Courts would do well to examine the
question of whether there is not an essential conflict between the reasonable doubt
instruction, which admonishes the jurors that the "burden is upon the prosecution
to convince you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime
he is charged to have committed," and a charge which questions the reasonableness
of any doubt not held by a majority of the jurors.
For a discussion of the criteria applied by the trial judge under both the historical
view and the Second Circuit rule, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1153-61 (1960). Illustrating
the historic treatment of reasonable doubt are Rodriquez v. United States, 232 F.2d
819, 821 (5th Cir. 1956); Isbell v. United States, 227 Fed. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915).
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Even if the Allen charge might in a given instance coerce a jury,
so long as such an effect was infrequent and could properly be singled
out for reversal by an appellate court, use of the instruction might still
be justified. Many trial devices, improperly used, can result in prejudice
to the defendant. The Allen charge, however, does not lend itself to
efficient appellate review, as can be seen by examining the factors which
have been given weight in past appeals. These include not only the
20
wording of the charge itself, which is subject to near-limitless variations,
21
but also necessary language that was not induded; apparent emphasis
given various parts of the charge; 22 length of time the jury deliberated
before the charge was given; 23 length of time after the charge before
the verdict was returned;2 4 and whether the defense objected to the
instruction. 25 Each new paraphrase of the charge brings up its own
questions of propriety, and courts have differed widely in their tolerance
for added or substituted language.
The difficulties present in determining the existence of coercion by
the length of time the jury spends in deliberation after the charge are
self-evident. Fifteen minutes, a court has decided, 26 is too brief a period
for a jury in disagreement to resolve differences "conscientiously." Yet
twenty-five minutes has been held to afford ample time for decision
without indication of undue influence from the trial judge.2 7 Sometimes
problems of wording and the time considerations have been considered
together in reviewing the propriety of an Allen charge. These cases
apparently hold that overstrong wording in an Allen instruction can be
rendered acceptable if the jury nevertheless requires a long period after
Leading Second Circuit rule opinions are United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1944); United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 761 (1943). See also cases cited in Goldstein, supra at
1159, nn.25, 26, 28, 29.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 484 (2d Cir. 1963); United States
v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341, 342-43 (4th Cir. 1962); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754,
757 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962); Jacobs v. United
States, 279 F.2d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 1960); State v. Bozarth, 361 S.V.2d 819 (Mo. 1962);
Janssen v. Carolina Lumber Co., 137 W. Va. 561, 73 S.E.2d 12 (1952).
21 United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961).
22 Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962).
23 Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
24 Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311, 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963);
United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 1961).
25 Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1960). See also defense objection
of a different sort in Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 305-06 (1905).
26 United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
27 Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
946 (1963).

392

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:386

the charge in which to reach agreement. It is questionable whether the
accused's rights should ever rest upon such inexact considerations.
Reversal because the judge inquired into the numerical breakdown of
the jury seems similarly imprecise.2 8 It ignores the fact that whether or
not the judge knows how the jury is voting, the jurors themselves know
how they stand. They are aware that, in using the Allen charge, the
judge is addressing only a part of their number. Reversals based on
such considerations are merely hedging admissions by the courts that
the charge can be coercive.
Cases in which use of the charge has been upheld bear out the contention that review standards are uncertain and even arbitrary. In
Huffman v. United States,29 the trial judge introduced thirteen separate
factors, most of them dearly irrelevant, into the supplemental charge
in an effort to "encourage" agreement. Among these were a recital of
the "duty" to agree (a duty which, arguably, does not exist);8 ° the
expense of the trial to the government and to taxpayers, the inconvenience to the judge and references to the fact that the jury had
"no escape" from its responsibility to decide the case. The charge was
upheld on appeal almost without comment by the majority, although
one judge dissented vigorously.31
In Chase v. State32 the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the use of the
Allen charge although the trial judge had been informed of both the
33
numerical breakdown of the jury and the way the majority was voting.
Though the Alaska court was not bound by Supreme Court holdings
that the charge could not be used under such circumstances, Chase
indicates that there are extreme differences of opinion as to what constitutes an abuse of discretion in the use of the charge.
At least one state has completely abandoned its version of the Allen
instruction because of the difficulties encountered on review. The Ari28 This point has occasionally been recognized in Allen charge opinions. See United
States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961).
29 297 F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962).
30 Brown, J., dissenting in Huffman v. United States, supra note 29, at 759, said:

"It is simply not legally correct that some jury must sometime decide that the defendant
is 'guilty' or 'not guilty. . . .' [A] succession of juries may legitimately fail to agree
until, at long last, the prosecution gives up. But such juries, perhaps more courageous
It is
than any other, have performed their useful, vital function in our system ....
I think a mistrial from a hung jury
in this independence that liberty is secured ....
is a safeguard to liberty."
31

Ibid.

369 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1962).
The jury foreman volunteered the information that there was an 11-i division,
and asked the judge whether the deadlock "proved that the state had not proved its
charge beyond a reasonable doubt and if the jury should now 'step down' to a lesser
charge even if the -majority felt that this should not be done." id. at 1004.
32
33
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zona court, after a series of cases in which use of the charge had been
evaluated on the merits, concluded that the instruction was impossible
to administer uniformly and thus not in keeping with sound justice and
the preservation of human liberties and security.3 4 The court pointed
out that whenever the charge had been up for review, disposition had
depended upon minute variations in fact situations surrounding use
of the charge: "No rule of thumb can circumscribe definite bounds
of when and where, or under what 'circumstances it should be given
or refused.... We are convinced that the evils far outweigh the benefits,
and decree that its use shall no longer be tolerated and approved by
this court." 35

There can be no doubt that the courts have been concerned with the
problem of whether the Allen instruction can cause a juror to abandon
his conscientious dissent and defer to the majority solely for the sake of
reaching agreement. The uneasy acceptance of the charge is evident
in the numerous cases in which slight changes of language or surrounding circumstances have tipped the scales toward a finding of error in
its use.3 0 This judicial attitude indicates that it is time for a closer
look at the charge and a consideration of alternatives more likely to
insure a fair and impartial trial. Few would maintain that the trial
judge should be required immediately to accept a jury's first indication of failure to agree without a fair attempt at encouraging agreement. It is only the method used to induce a verdict that is questionable.
Total elimination of the Allen charge would bring its own problems;
it would leave a void that would necessarily have to be filled in some
way by the court. (Sending a jury back to its deliberations in stony
silence might in itself be coercive.) 37 Some have suggested that the
charge be given along with the original instructions, so as to avoid the
criticism that it is directed at only a part of the jury. It is difficult to
see how this would do more than merely temper the objectionable
qualities of the charge; it certainly would not detract from its basic
impropriety. In any event, there would be no guarantee that such a use
of the instruction would eliminate deadlocked juries.
Perhaps the most promising solution would be to adopt a substitute
instruction which eliminated the objectionable qualities of the Allen
charge. Such an instruction should, first of all, explain to the jury as
34 State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959).
35 Id. at 166, 342 P.2d at 200.
3( See cases cited supra, notes 7, 10.
37 The jurors naturally look to the court for approval and encouragement. Sending
a jury back for additional deliberation in silence could be interpreted as an act of
impatience of disapproval, and might intimidate a juror as effectively as would an
urgent order from the court, to come to immediate agreement.
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a whole its duty to harmonize divergent views where possible, rather
than addressing the minority alone. At least equal emphasis should be
given to the point that each juror is entitled, in any event, to retain
his conscientious convictions. 38 An effective supplemental instruction,
aimed not at forcing, but merely at encouraging agreement, could be
formulated. Any loss of "efficiency" brought on by the more judicious
wording could be attributed to a corresponding loss in coercive effect.
39
while perhaps not perfect,
The charge employed in State v. Bozarth,A
furnishes a good starting point for the formulation of a substitute instruction:
Open and frank discussion by you in your jury room of the
evidence in this case may aid you in agreeing upon the facts;
however, no juror should ever agree to a verdict that violates
the instructions of the court, nor find as a fact that which under
the evidence and his conscience he believes to be untrue, yet each
of you should respect the opinions of your fellow jurors as you
would have them respect yours, and in the spirit of tolerance
and understanding endeavor to bring the deliberations of the
40
whole jury to an agreement upon a verdict.
Such a substitute instruction should be made uniform for all courts
within a jurisdiction, and language added by the judge should be prohibited. Uniformity, in this instance, could not work hardship if the instruction were properly noncommittal. If it is felt that a revised instruction
would be so lacking in persuasiveness as to be useless, the alternative should
be to prohibit any use of supplementary instructions, other than perhaps
general urging to "try again." The Allen charge has admitted coercive
potential, it is exceptionally difficult to cope with on appeal, and it
may be a denial of the accused's right to a jury trial. So questionable
a practice should not be permitted to continue.
38 This point is always dutifully covered in the Allen charge, but it is often
given cursory or incidental treatment. It also is usually the first point mentioned,

with the final (and most emphatic) part of the charge dwelling on the objectionable
"heed the majority" theme.
39 861 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. 1962).
40 Id. at 826.

